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ABSTRACT
Using gamepad-driven devices like games consoles is an ac-
tivity frequently shared with others. Thus, shoulder-surfing
is a serious threat. To address this threat, we present the
first investigation of shoulder-surfing resistant text pass-
word entry on gamepads by (1) identifying the requirements
of this context; (2) assessing whether shoulder-surfing re-
sistant authentication schemes proposed in non-gamepad
contexts can be viably adapted to meet these requirements;
(3) proposing “Colorwheels”, a novel shoulder-surfing resis-
tant authentication scheme specifically geared towards this
context; (4) using two different methodologies proposed in
the literature for evaluating shoulder-surfing resistance to
compare “Colorwheels”, on-screen keyboards (the de facto
standard in this context), and an existing shoulder-surfing
resistant scheme which we identified during our assessment
and adapted for the gamepad context; (5) evaluating all three
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schemes regarding their usability. Having applied different
methodologies to measure shoulder-surfing resistance, we
discuss their strengths and pitfalls and derive recommenda-
tions for future research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Gamepad-driven devices such as gaming consoles are an im-
portant part of many people’s lives. It is common to use ac-
counts for e.g. video streaming like Netflix, music streaming
like Spotify, or game networks like Playstation Network on
these devices. A 2017 report by the entertainment software
association found that about half of all American households
own a dedicated gaming console [14]. For many users time
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spent on their consoles is a social activity and therefore oc-
curs in shared spaces: 53% of the users play on average five
hours with others in person per week (as opposed to online
multiplayer games) [14]. Accounts used on these consoles are
protected by text passwords, and the passwords are entered
almost exclusively using on-screen keyboards. Considering
that Renaud et al. [24] found in their survey that 90.9% of
their participants would authenticate when not alone, oppor-
tunistic shoulder-surfing [34] is a real threat, leaving users in
a dilemma: either show mistrust of people by asking them to
look away [12], behave insecurely by letting them observe,
or store the password on the device, which enables purchases
by every person with access to the device.
In this work, we present the first investigation of shoulder-
surfing resistant authentication using gamepads. Our main
contributions are: (1) We identify the requirements of au-
thentication using gamepads as application scenario (sec-
tion 2). One of the defining requirements of this scenario is
the resistance to opportunistic shoulder-surfing. (2) Based on
these requirements, we analyse both, authentication schemes
currently deployed for gamepads and shoulder-surfing resis-
tant schemes proposed in non-gamepad contexts (section 3).
While most do not meet the gamepad scenario specific re-
quirements identified in section 2, the grid-based scheme
proposed by Kim et al. [21] can be easily adapted to meet
these requirements. (3) We propose a novel authentication
scheme called Colorwheels which is designed to meet the
requirements identified before, i.e. in particular to be resis-
tant to opportunistic shoulder-surfing (section 4). Its design
is specifically geared towards usage with gamepads. (4) To
evaluate its efficacy in mitigating shoulder-surfing attacks,
we conducted two user studies (section 5): an online study
(section 6) and a lab study (section 7). In both studies, we
compared Colorwheels to two other solutions: (a) an on-screen
keyboard which represents the de facto standard of authenti-
cation using gamepads and (b) the grid-based scheme [21]
which we adapted for the usage with gamepads. To evaluate
the shoulder-surfing resistance, participants were asked to
recover a password by observing video recordings of its entry.
(5) To gauge the usability, we let the participants of the lab
study use our implementations of the three authentication
schemes themselves and measured their performance with
respect to the metrics efficiency, effectiveness and satisfac-
tion (section 7). Additionally, we captured the participants’
thoughts on the schemes using qualitative questions.
Our results confirm that the commonly used on-screen
keyboard provides only little protection even against oppor-
tunistic shoulder-surfing: It is significantly more suscepti-
ble to shoulder-surfing than the other two schemes in both
studies. Both other schemes fare better, but our proposal
Colorwheels seems to exhibit a more robust shoulder-surfing
resistance. Usability-wise, the on-screen keyboard fares best.
It performs significantly better in terms of efficiency and sat-
isfaction than the other two schemes as well as significantly
better in terms of effectiveness than Colorwheels. Colorwheels
scores significantly better in terms of efficiency and satisfac-
tion than the grid-based scheme. No significant difference
between the two could be found in terms of effectiveness. We
discuss these results as well as the strength and limitations of
the two methodologies we used to evaluate shoulder-surfing
resistance (section 8).
2 REQUIREMENTS
In this section we describe the requirements that specifically
apply to the scenario of password entry on gamepads1.
Security Requirements. Using gamepad-driven devices
is for many users a social activity: 53% of the users play on
average five hours with others in person per week (as op-
posed to online multiplayer games) [14]. Thus, usage of these
devices occurs in a so-called shared space [24]. Another defin-
ing aspect of authentication using gamepad-driven devices
such as game consoles is that they are usually used in con-
junction with large displays such as TVs. Tan and Czerwinski
[29] found that users were more likely to read sensitive con-
tent on large screens and note that since such devices are
usually outside a user’s “personal zone”, they might be per-
ceived as less private. Together, these two aspects indicate a
large potential for shoulder-surfing threats. However, several
types of shoulder-surfing attackers must be differentiated.
Wiese and Roth [34] propose four types:
(1) Single Recording, SR: Attacker gets a small number of
recorded authentication procedures.
(2) Multiple Recording, MR: Attacker gets a huge number
of recorded authentication procedures.
(3) Opportunistic observer, OO: Attacker observes a small
number of authentication procedures.
(4) Insider Observer, IO: Attacker observes a huge number
of authentication procedures.
In the first two categories (SR & MR) the human ability, e.g.
memory retention, plays a subordinate role, as the password
entries are recorded and can be played back and paused at
will. In the second two categories (OO & IO) the attackers
observe the whole process and try to remember the most
important details. Afterwards they depend on their memory
retention to try to log in with the user data. Due to the
threat model of usage in shared spaces, the opportunistic
observer is the most likely attacker in the gamepad scenario.
Any recording of the authentication procedure by a friend
sitting on the user’s couch right next to them is likely to
draw attention. Therefore, the first requirement is:
R1:Authentication schemes used on gamepad-driven devices
must resist shoulder-surfing attacks by opportunistic observers.
1Note, this does not lift general requirements of the authentication domain.
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Figure 1: The controls available on a typical gamepad.
Technical Requirements. In comparison to a keyboard,
gamepads offer far less buttons and in comparison to amouse,
far less precise analog movement input. The input capabili-
ties of a typical gamepad (see Figure 1) are reflected by:
R2: Authentication schemes used on gamepad-driven de-
vices must not require as controls more than eight freely pro-
grammable buttons, one directional control pad, two analog
sticks, and two analog triggers if they are to be compatible with
the gamepads of most modern gamepad-driven devices.
The controls used for directional input on gamepads (i.e.
analog sticks) are generally less precise than a mouse [15].
The second technical requirement reflects this:
R3:Authentication schemes used on gamepad-driven devices
must not require high-precision input.
The accounts used on gamepad-driven devices usually
require text password authentication (e.g. common services
such as Amazon Video or Xbox Live). Therefore, remaining
compatible to these accounts is of the essence:
R4:Authentication schemes used on gamepad-driven devices
must be compatible with text passwords.
The operating systems of gamepad-driven devices do usu-
ally not allow installation of drivers for additional hardware.
Thus, the following requirement arises:
R5: Authentication schemes used on gamepad-driven de-
vices must not require support for additional hardware such as
biometric readers or token devices.
Usability Requirement. The layout of the gamepads
in conjunction with human anatomy poses restrictions on
the controls which can be used simultaneously to enter a
password. Thus, we need the following requirement:
R6: Authentication schemes used on gamepad-driven de-
vices must not require two or more controls on the front to be
operated at the same time.
3 ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING SCHEMES
In this section, we first briefly introduce the deployed schemes
and explain why they are not likely to meet the security
requirement R1. Thereafter, we introduce existing shoulder-
surfing resistant schemes (i.e. schemes meeting R1), and
assess their suitability for usage with gamepads.
Figure 2: The grid-based scheme.
Schemes Deployed in the Gamepad Context. All cur-
rent game consoles offer on-screen keyboards for all text
entries, including text passwords. The on-screen keyboards
consist of a grid of buttons. To enter a character, the user
moves a visible cursor to the desired character and confirms
the input by pressing a specific (platform dependent) button
on the gamepad. Due to the cursor highlighting the current
input the whole time, this scheme is highly prone to shoulder-
surfing threats. The only other currently deployed scheme
to enter text passwords is Daisy Wheel. However, it is only
available on the Steam platform with a special gamepad. Its
interface contains eight petals, each displaying four different
characters. First the petal is selected and then one of the four
characters in this petal. Since the selected character in the
petal briefly blinks as visual feedback, this scheme is highly
prone to shoulder-surfing threats. Some devices also offer
PIN code protection when being switched on (analogously
to smartphone PIN code locks), where the numbers 0 to 9 are
mapped to different gamepad controls. At the PIN security
level these schemes are, however, inadequate for other ac-
counts (e.g. video or music streaming) and observing which
buttons are pressed on the gamepad is easily possible.
Existing Shoulder-Surfing Resistant Schemes. To
counteract shoulder-surfing threats, several techniques can
be employed. To comply with R5, only knowledge-based au-
thenticationmethods are considered.We present an overview
of the assessment of existing schemes in table 1. In summary,
only three schemes seem to meet all requirements: (1) the
grid-based scheme [21]: It uses aM × N grid of characters,
where N is the length of the password, i.e. there is one col-
umn in the grid for each character in the password, andM is
the number of characters visible at the same time in each col-
umn, i.e. the number of rows. Figure 2 depicts the interface
and concept of this authentication scheme. The characters
of the password do not have to be aligned in the same row.
Thus, the number of rows determines the shoulder-surfing
resistance of the scheme. (2) PairPasswordChar [23]: It uses a
grid in which all characters available for input are randomly
placed and the user has to click into certain areas of the grid
determined by the placement of the characters used in their
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Table 1: Assessment of whether the existing shoulder-surfing resistant authentication schemes from non-
gamepad contexts fulfill the remaining requirements R2-R6.
Proposal R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Secure Haptic Keypad [4] yes yes yes somewhat, haptic feed-
back not for individual
buttons
yes
Glass Unlock [35] yes yes yes no, requires external pri-
vate display
yes
ForcePIN [22] no, requires more force
sensitive controls
yes yes yes yes
Undercover [27] no, requires concealed
placement of trackball
yes somewhat, requires ex-
tension of the input grid
yes yes
Tetrad [24] yes yes no, graphical yes yes
DAS variants [36] yes yes no, graphical yes yes
Convex Hull Click [32] yes somewhat, designed for
mouse input
no, graphical yes yes
Grid-based scheme [21] yes yes yes yes yes
S3PAS [37] yes somewhat, designed for
mouse input
yes yes yes
PairPasswordChar [23] yes yes yes yes yes
Xside [11] no, requires touch inter-
face on back of device
yes yes yes yes
Magnetic Gestures [26] yes yes yes no, requires magnetic
sensor
yes
Cognitive Trapdoor [25] yes yes somewhat, requires ex-
tension of character grid
yes yes
SwiPIN [30] no, requires too many di-
rectional controls when
scaled up from PIN to text
password
yes yes yes yes
Behavioural biometrics [10] yes yes yes yes yes
password and a set of rules. (3) Behavioural biometrics based
on the user’s specific gesturing patterns [10].
4 NEW PROPOSAL: COLORWHEELS
While some of the shoulder-surfing resistant schemes de-
scribed in the last section can be adapted for use on gamepads,
none of them were developed specifically for the usage on
gamepads. Thus, we propose in this section a novel pass-
word entry scheme: Colorwheels. Colorwheels is specifically
designed for shoulder-surfing resistant input of text pass-
words on gamepads. The general design of the scheme is
based on pie menu structures [6], similar to the Daisy Wheel
scheme described in section 3. Its interface consists of two
pie menu “flowers” with eight petals each. These overall
16 petals contain all possible characters (i.e. uppercase and
lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters) for the
password entry. This design is depicted in figure 3. Color-
wheels is designed specifically for text entry with a gamepad,
thus meeting requirements R4 and R5. Due to the two flow-
ers, Colorwheels’s operation necessitates the availability of
two analog sticks on the gamepad. Each stick is used to select
petals in one of the flowers: the left stick to select petals in
the left flower and the right stick to select petals in the right
Figure 3: Colorwheels.
flower. Each petal holds either 6 or 5 characters, allowing the
placement of all 94 printable ASCII-characters (excluding
the white space) on the petals of the two flowers.
To introduce shoulder-surfing resistance into the scheme,
the entry of each password character is performed with the
following procedure: (1) The characters appear randomly
distributed on the petals of the two flowers. (2) The user
locates the petal with the desired character and presses the
×-button to confirm that they have found it. Upon pressing
the button, all the characters vanish from the petals. (3) The
user selects the petal. Each flower corresponds input-wise
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to one of the two analog sticks. To select a petal in the left
or right flower, the left or right analog stick has to be used
respectively. Since there are only eight different positions for
each analog stick, the scheme meets R3. Then the selection
of the petal is confirmed using any of the shoulder buttons.
At any time during the procedure, the scheme requires at
most two concurrent controls on the front and less than the
number of overall available buttons, meeting requirements
R2 and R6. Using the □-button, the last entered character
can be deleted. To obtain the password, a shoulder-surfing
attacker would have to memorize the random distribution
of all characters in the time the user locates the petal with
the character they want to enter. We believe this task is cog-
nitively demanding enough to protect against opportunistic
shoulder surfing, i.e. meeting requirement R1.
5 METHODOLOGY OF THE USER STUDIES
We evaluate our proposal Colorwheels described in the last
section against the following two existing approaches: Firstly,
we compare it against the grid-based scheme. Of the three
schemes identified in section 3, the grid-based scheme seems
to be the most suitable for a comparative study. Behavioural
biometrics have not yet been applied in the gamepad context
and getting a baseline is beyond the scope of this work. Pair-
PasswordChar requires the memorization of multiple rules
for its correct operation and is thus not easily understood.
Secondly, we compare it against the on-screen keyboard:
While it likely does not meet requirement R1 as explained in
section 3, it is the current de facto standard in the gamepad
context and hence a useful baseline for our comparison. We
measure the actual level of shoulder-surfing resistance for
all three schemes as well as their general usability according
to ISO 9241-11:2018-03 [18]. The methodology conforms to
all requirements of our university’s ethics commission.
Hypotheses. Since the on-screen keyboard (as our con-
trol condition) does not employ any measures to counter
shoulder-surfing attacks, we expect it to perform worst in
this aspect. The respective hypotheses are:
H1a : The Colorwheels scheme is more resistant to shoulder-
surfing attacks than the on-screen keyboard.
H1b : The grid-based scheme is more resistant to shoulder-
surfing attacks than the on-screen keyboard.
While the grid-based scheme is geared towards being
shoulder-surfing resistant, the full entry is gradually revealed
during password entry and old input is visible until the com-
plete password is entered. Thus, a simple shoulder-surfing
strategy is to memorize the characters in one column each
time and then check during the next observation which one
of the five characters appears again. In contrast, Colorwheels
shows the randomly distributed characters only before the
individual character selection is performed (cf. section 4).
Therefore, the attacker would have to memorize the com-
plete (randomized) character layout (i.e. the positions of all
94 characters) for each character in the password. Therefore,
we expect Colorwheels to be more resistant:
H1c : The Colorwheels scheme is more resistant to shoulder-
surfing attacks than the grid-based scheme.
Design Decisions for the Methodology. Most studies
regarding shoulder-surfing resistance are conducted as lab
studies (e.g. [4, 5, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 26, 30, 35]). In contrast,
only very few user studies have been conducted online [1,
31]. Yet, both types of studies have their advantages and
disadvantages in the domain of password entry on gamepads.
A lab study allows our participants to use the schemes
themselves to get familiar with the potentially unknown
scheme. At the same time, a lab study also allows testing
the usability of the schemes. In contrast, an online study
would have to rely on explanatory videos and texts for the
familiarization with the schemes and testing the usability
would not be possible. Also, users might be more motivated
in a lab study since they are observed. Online studies, on the
other hand, are unobserved and therefore allow controlling
less confounding variables. Attention check questions can
help mitigate this problem by asking whether the participant
cheated [1]. However, such attention checks always rely
on self-reported data and must thus be complemented by
other metrics. Yet, participants can engage the online study
whenever they have time, without the need of supervision by
an experimenter, facilitating the collection of large samples.
Due to the different advantages and disadvantages, we
decided to conduct an online study and a lab study. The
design of our two studies is based on themethodology of Aviv
et al. [1], who conducted a blend of an online study and a lab
study to gain a baseline for the shoulder-surfing resistance
of smartphone PINs and the Android pattern lock. In the
following we only give a brief overview of their methodology
and how we needed to adapt it for the gamepad context. The
detailed procedures are described in section 6 for the online
study and section 7 for the lab study.
The actual evaluation of the shoulder-surfing resistance
by Aviv et al. [1] is based on 10 attack trials using “video
recordings of a single expert user being attacked by partici-
pants”. We decided to follow this methodology. As in [1], the
videos for the grid-based and on-screen keyboard schemes
were varied regarding the entry speed of the password and
the interaction, i.e. different paths taken on the on-screen key-
board from one character to the next and different scrolling
direction for the columns in the grid-based scheme. For Col-
orwheels only the speed was varied, since the interaction
cannot be changed. Due to the mobile scenario, Aviv et al.
[1] also varied the size of the device and the viewing angle
in the videos and treated both as within-factors. We felt that
this was not in line with the gamepad scenario, since it can be
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assumed that the observer has a clear and unobstructed view
of the full GUI on the screen (e.g. from the couch in front of
the television), when the goal is to watch a movie or play
a game together. Also, observing the gamepad in addition
to the screen does not give an advantage, since all input is
directly reflected in the authentication schemes’ GUIs. In the
grid-based scheme, the GUI shows which column is selected
and the letters are shifted in the direction pressed on the
analog stick. Only which letters are visible on the screen at
the end is important to an observing attacker, the input at
the gamepad is not. For Colorwheels, the GUI highlights the
petal which is selected using the analog sticks, also directly
reflecting the input. Consequently, the videos showed only
the authentication schemes as displayed on the screen.
The password in the videos was chosen to not introduce
bias into the study. We wanted to use a password that re-
quired usage of the different character sets in the on-screen
keyboard, since we did not want to render the shoulder-
surfing task unnecessarily easy for this scheme and there-
fore favour the other two schemes in the study. Also, using
a dictionary word might have put the grid-based scheme in
a disadvantage and favoured the other two schemes. There-
fore, the password in the videos was chosen at random to
include uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers and
symbols. The random password entered in all the videos for
the on-screen keyboard and the grid-based scheme isW8@b=L.
The length of six characters was chosen according to the
NIST recommendation for random memorized secrets [17].
To align the guessing probability of Colorwheels with that of
the grid-based scheme, we had to increase the length of the
password by one character to W8@b=Lx.
Like Aviv et al. [1], we treated the different schemes as
between-subjects factor and participants were not allowed
to take notes. For our lab study, we recruited participants
locally. For the online study, we used the German panel
“Clickworker” since this allowed us to use the exact same
videos as for the locally recruited (German) participants.
Apparatus. We implemented all three schemes using the
Unity game engine. During development, all implementa-
tions were tested in informal pre-test sessions with people
recruited on campus. We already described the implementa-
tion of Colorwheels in section 4.
On-Screen Keyboard. The implementation was designed to
resemble the layout and functionality commonly found on
gamepad-driven devices.
Grid-Based Scheme. This scheme was designed to resemble
the original depictions in [21] as much as possible. The inter-
face comprises a grid of 6 by 7 cells, as depicted in figure 4.
However, the centre 6 by 5 cells (visually highlighted in the
interface) are considered for the password entry. To oper-
ate the scheme only the analog sticks are needed. Pushing
any stick to the left or right lets the user select the column.
Figure 4: Our implementation of the grid-based scheme. The
currently selected column is highlighted in turquoise.
Pushing up or down scrolls the characters in that column.
Following the pre-tests, we also added the functionality to
scroll the characters in the selected column up with the
L1/R1-buttons and to scroll the characters in the column
down with the L2/R2-buttons. The scroll buttons in the orig-
inal depictions, which were used for the mouse input, were
not needed anymore and therefore removed.
6 ONLINE STUDY
Procedure. The study consisted of the following phases:
Introduction and Informed Consent. The participants first
received information about the study scenario, the remainder
of the study, the anonymity of their data, and explanations
in case they want to withdraw from the study. Furthermore,
participants were asked to not complete the study on a mo-
bile device and to provide their consent for participation
and processing. On the next site, they were asked whether
their eye sight was normal (with or without corrections).
Participants who reported to have a bad eye sight were told
that they could unfortunately not participate in our study.
Familiarization with the Scheme. Participants were then
randomly assigned to one of the three schemes and shown
an explanatory text and illustrations describing the assigned
scheme. They were also asked to watch a video similar to
those used later in the study but with a different password
(they were told which password was entered in this video).
Shoulder-surfing the Scheme. Participants had to play the
role of an attacker performing a shoulder-surfing attack. To
that end, they watched the videos as outlined in section 5.
Participants were told that they are not allowed to pause
or rewind the video, take pictures or videos of the online
study and its contents, or use pen and paper to take notes.
We further hid the control elements of the video player to
prevent participants from pausing, rewinding, or replaying
the video. Videos could be started by the participant by click-
ing on it and were played in full-screen mode. We also hid
the button for proceeding to the next page of the question-
naire until the video was finished. Participants watched the
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Table 2: Participants’ demographics (F=female, M=male) and the shoulder-surfing results of the online study.
Gender Age Number of observations Failed to
obtain








50 > 60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
On-screen keyboard 8 11 0 6 5 5 2 1 4 1 1 2 1 3 7
Grid-based scheme 6 13 0 4 8 4 3 0 1 1 17
Colorwheels scheme 14 12 1 9 7 6 3 0 26
Total 28 36 1 19 20 15 8 1
videos for the scheme they were assigned to one after the
other until they either had successfully recovered the pass-
word from the input shown in the video, or had watched all
ten videos without successfully recovering the password. In
between the videos they could either enter a guess for the
password in a free text field or indicate that they have no
idea about the password at all. In case the participants suc-
cessfully recovered the password they were complimented
on their performance. In case they failed to recover the pass-
word they were told that they should not bother as the aim of
the study was to evaluate the respective scheme’s resistance
against shoulder-surfing. Participants who were assigned
Colorwheels or the grid-based scheme were also told that this
scheme was specifically developed to be resistant.
Attention Checks.We asked them whether they had used
any aids to help them guess the password, whether they
had found and applied a possibility to pause or rewind the
video, and whether they had completed the study on amobile
device. These questions served both as attention check and
to check whether participants had followed our instructions.
Demographics and Debriefing. Finally, participants were
asked to provide information about their demographics. On
the last page, we thanked the participants and provided the
code they needed to receive their compensation as well as
contact details in case any questions would arise.
Participants. We recruited our participants using the
German panel “Clickworker”. Participants required on aver-
age 13 minutes and received a compensation of 3€. 93 par-
ticipants completed our study. 10 had to be excluded from
the analysis because they failed attention checks. In addi-
tion, we excluded 10 participants who stayed less than 14
seconds on the page introducing the scheme, since this is
insufficient to familiarize themselves with the scheme2. Four
participants had to be excluded because the completion times
for the video pages were shorter than the length of the video
and five due to technical problems. The final sample thus
includes 64 participants (see table 2).
Results. To test H1a - H1c , we ran three Mann-Whitney
U tests to account for the ordinal scale level of our data
(i.e., number of observations needed to obtain the password,
214 seconds was the shortest time spent on the introductory page by a
participant who successfully guessed the password.
whereas participants who failed to obtain the password after
having watched all ten videos were coded with “11”). We
used a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha-level of .0167. Table 2 lists
the values for all three authentication schemes. The analy-
sis showed that, in accordance to our assumptions, the on-
screen keyboard is least resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks,
with participants needing more observations to obtain the
password compared to Colorwheels (Z=-4.61, p<.001, r=.687).
Thus, H1a is supported. Likewise, more observations are
needed to obtain the password entered with the grid-based
scheme than with the on-screen keyboard (Z=-3.50, p=.002,
r=.567), thereby supporting H1b . The analysis did not reveal
significant differences between the number of observations
needed to obtain the password entered with the Colorwheels
scheme and with the grid-based scheme (Z=-1.67, p=.094).
Thus, H1c is not supported.
7 LAB STUDY
Procedure. The study consisted of the following phases:
Introduction and Informed Consent. The participants first
received a short briefing and signed the consent form.
Familiarization with the Scheme. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the schemes and received an ex-
planation of the scheme. To familiarize themselves with the
assigned scheme they used it three times to enter a password.
Usability Assessment. All participants had to enter three
different randomly generated passwords which we provided
to them. Effectiveness is measured using the portion of suc-
cessful password entries among the three. Efficiency is as-
sessed using the mean of the average time needed to enter
the password across the three password entries. Satisfaction
was measured with the SUS.
Shoulder-surfing the Scheme. All participants watched
the videos as outlined in section 5. Participants watched
the videos for the scheme they had used before, one after
the other until they either had successfully recovered the
password, they had watched all ten videos, or they asked to
stop the experiment since they felt they would never be able
to recover the password. In between the videos they noted
their guess for the password on a paper provided to them.
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Table 3: Participants’ demographics in the lab study
Gender Age Experience with game consoles
Authentication scheme Female Male < 20 20–30 31–40 41–50 51–50 > 60 low medium high
On-screen keyboard 14 15 3 16 3 5 1 1 10 10 9
Grid-based scheme 12 17 6 17 6 0 0 0 10 9 10
Colorwheels scheme 11 18 7 13 8 0 1 0 10 10 9
Total 37 50 16 46 17 5 2 1 30 29 28
Figure 5: Effectiveness measured as the number of success-
ful authentications performed in the first part of the study.
Demographics and Debriefing. Participants provided infor-
mation about their demographics, received a short debriefing,
were thanked, and received their compensation.
Participants. A total of 87 individuals (37 female, 50
male) participated in our study (see table 3 for participants’
demographics). For our study, we wanted a diverse mix of
participants having varying degrees of prior experience with
gamepads and game consoles. Therefore, all potential par-
ticipants had to fill out a short online signup-questionnaire
asking them about their experience with game consoles and
gamepads (low, medium, or high) and their email address, so
that we could inform them in case they were selected for the
study. Links to this signup-questionnaire were distributed on
campus using flyers and mailinglists. Additionally, postings
were made in several Facebook groups and online forums
relating to console gaming to recruit participants outside the
university. Participants received a compensation of 5€.
Shoulder-Surfing Resistance Results. Since the par-
ticipants in our lab study had the opportunity to stop before
having watched all ten videos, we cannot analyze how many
observations participants needed to obtain the password.
Participants might have been able to successfully guess the
password if they had continued. We therefore consider how
many participants succeeded in obtaining the password, in-
dependently of how many videos they watched.
To account for the nominal scale level of our data, we
use Fisher‘s exact test to investigate H1a - H1c . We used a
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha-level of .0167. Similar to the re-
sults from the online study, the analysis showed that the on-
screen keyboard provides little protection against shoulder-
surfing, with 27 out of 29 participants successfully obtaining
the password entered with this scheme, which is significantly
more than those entered with the Colorwheels scheme (0 out
of 29, FET: p<.001) and the grid-based scheme (11 out of
29, FET: p<.001). H1a and H1b are thus supported by our
results. Finally, a third Fisher’s exact test revealed that signif-
icantly more participants succeeded to obtain the password
entered with the grid-based scheme than with the Color-
wheels scheme (FET: p<.001), providing support for H1c .
Usability Results. The usability was assessed in terms
of effectiveness, efficiency, and the participants’ satisfaction.
Effectiveness. Figure 5 shows an overview of the successful
authentication attempts. We used non-parametric tests for
the analysis since a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated non-
normally distributed scores for all three schemes (p<.001).
A Kruskall-Wallis test revealed significant differences in ef-
fectiveness between the three schemes (χ 2(2)=7.54, p=.023,
η2=.066). Pairwise comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests
with a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha-level of .0167 revealed a
significantly higher rate of successful password entries with
the on-screen keyboard compared to the Colorwheels scheme
(Z=-2.67, p=.008, r=.35). There were no significant differences
between Colorwheels and the grid-based scheme (Z=-1.59,
p=.113) or the grid-based scheme and the on-screen keyboard
(Z=-1.22, p=.222). Looking at the errors participants made
during the three authentication attempts reveals that the
similarity of characters is a major problem of the grid-based
scheme: 9 out of 11 failed authentication attempts using the
grid-based scheme can be attributed to participants confus-
ing the target character with a similar character, whereas
only 3 out of 6 failed authentication attempts arise from
this problem for the on-screen keyboard and 9 out of 20 for
Colorwheels. Other errors include participants mixing up up-
percase and lowercase letters (1 for the on-screen keyboard
and Colorwheels each, 2 for the grid-based scheme), forget-
ting to enter a character or entering an extra character (2
for the on-screen keyboard), and entering completely wrong
characters (10 for Colorwheels).
Shoulder-surfing resistant password entry on gamepads CHI 2019, May 4–9, 2019, Glasgow, Scotland UK
Efficiency. Figure 6 shows an overview of the times needed
to enter the password. Outliers deviating more than 1.5-times
the interquartile range from the mean were excluded from
the analysis, resulting in an exclusion of four data points
(two falling below the threshold for the on-screen keyboard,
and one each falling below and exceeding the threshold for
the Colorwheels scheme). All assumptions for conducting an
ANOVA were met. Thus, we ran an ANOVA with the used
scheme as the independent variable and the mean of the
overall time needed to enter the password across the three
password entries as the dependent variable. The analysis
revealed significant differences in the mean time needed to
enter the password (F(2,80)=93.78, p<.001, partial η2=0.701).
Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha-level
of .0167 showed that participants need significantly less time
to enter the password using the on-screen keyboard com-
pared to the Colorwheels scheme (t(52)=-16.81, p<.001, r=.92)
and the grid-based scheme (t(32.39)=-12.10, p<.001, r=.91).
However, authenticating themselves also took participants
significantly less time using the Colorwheels scheme com-
pared to the grid-based scheme (t(34.36)=-4.88, p<.001, r=.62).
Satisfaction. Figure 7 shows an overview of the SUS scores.
Again, we excluded outliers deviating more than 1.5-times
the interquartile range from the mean from the analysis,
resulting in an exclusion of four data points (three falling be-
low the threshold for the on-screen keyboard and one falling
below the threshold for the Colorwheels scheme). All assump-
tions for conducting an ANOVA were met. Thus, we ran an
ANOVA with the authentication scheme used to enter the
password as the independent variable and the SUS scores
as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed significant
differences in the SUS scores (F(2,80)=33.40, p<.001, partial
η2=0.455). Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni-adjusted
alpha-level of .0167 showed that the SUS scores were sig-
nificantly higher for the on-screen keyboard compared to
the Colorwheels scheme (t(40.01)=5.71, p<.001, r=.67) and the
grid-based scheme (t(39.30)=8.85, p<.001, r=.82). However,
the SUS scores also indicate that participants were signifi-
cantly more satisfied with the Colorwheels scheme than with
the grid-based scheme (t(55)=2.92, p<.005, r=.37).
8 DISCUSSION
Study Results. Unsurprisingly, the on-screen keyboard does
not fare well in terms of security. Hypotheses H1a and H1b
are supported in both studies, indicating that the grid-based
scheme and our own proposalColorwheels aremore shoulder-
surfing resistant than the on-screen keyboard. The results
regarding H1c , i.e. the differences between the grid-based
scheme and Colorwheels are more ambiguous. While the
online study does not indicate a difference, the lab study
does. This discrepancy might be due to differences in the
study setting. The attackers in the lab study were stronger:
Figure 6: Boxplots of the mean overall time needed to enter
the password.
Figure 7: Boxplots of the SUS scores.
they (1) had expertise with gamepads (cf. table 3), (2) used the
schemes before the actual “attack” and (3) saw their previous
guesses when writing down the next one (since all guesses
were written down on the same sheet of paper). We believe
this points towards Colorwheels’s shoulder-surfing resistance
being more robust, even in the face of stronger attackers.
Usability-wise, the on-screen keyboard fares overall best,
outperforming the other two schemes. This is unsurprising,
since the scheme is deployed in the wild and therefore partic-
ipants are likely to know it. In contrast, Colorwheels and the
grid-based scheme were unknown to them. Regarding the
differences between these two schemes, Colorwheels fares
slightly better. Efficiency-wise, the combination of visual
search and interaction required to enter each character in
the grid-based scheme seems to take longer than the alter-
nating visual search and interaction tasks in Colorwheels.
Also, Shiffrin and Schneider [28] showed that people can
learn to search in parallel for a particular set of targets, in-
dicating that entry times with Colorwheels might decrease
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over time. In the gamepad context passwords are usually not
entered very frequently, rendering efficiency less important.
Effectiveness-wise there does not seem to be a significant dif-
ference. Yet, both schemes can be improved: despite the font
in the schemes being explicitly chosen to be monospaced,
with serfis, and so that usually similar looking characters (e.g.
the letter “O” and the number “0”) could be distinguished, it
lead to a number of mistakes, where similar characters were
confused with one another. Satisfaction-wise, Colorwheels
and the grid-based scheme fare worse than the on-screen key-
board. However, Colorwheels’s SUS score (75) is still in the
“good” range [3] and exceeds the grid-based scheme (64).
Limitations. We discuss the limitations of our studies
along the metrics validity, replicability, and reliability [7–9].
Validity. The online study setting did not allow using
a large screen (e.g. television) as monitor for the videos.
Hence, to remain compatible, the lab study was performed
on a smaller 13" screen as well. Thus, participants might
have performed differently in settings with large screens.
We argue, however, that this limitation does not negatively
impact our study. Participants had the explicit instruction
to try and observe the password entry. Thus, the privacy-
diminishing effects of large displays as outlined in section 2
lose importance. Furthermore, both studies used videos. We
had to compromise and use videos due to the intention of con-
ducting an online study. Yet, it must be acknowledged that
in a live observation study more attackers might have suc-
cessfully observed the password [2, 33]. Also, all videos were
watched directly one after the other and there was no other
interaction during password entry. Usually the victim would
enter the password only once and in case multiple people are
present, the attacker might be distracted by e.g. a conversa-
tion. In the lab study the setting was easily controlled. It was
ensured that participants followed all instructions. To com-
pensate the lack of direct control over the participants, the
online study used additional self-reported attention check
questions (e.g. whether participants took notes) and techni-
cal measures (e.g. to prevent controlling the video playback
and prevent skipping of videos by hiding the button to get
to the next page until the video had finished playing). Yet,
all measures ran in the participant’s browser. Some partici-
pants managed to circumvent these measures and had to be
excluded from our study. These exclusions were based on
the participants’ time spent on the pages showing the videos.
We also excluded participants who spent very little time fa-
miliarizing themselves with the authentication schemes in
the online study. Thereby, we used the same time limit for
all schemes, despite participants being potentially already
familiar with the on-screen keyboard, to prevent favouring
the other schemes, by making sure people spent more time
with their descriptions. Moreover, analogously to Aviv et al.
[1] we did not allow participants to take any notes during the
attack. We believe this increases the consistency between the
two studies and among the participants of the online study.
Yet, in a real “attack”, an attacker might use their smartphone
to take text notes, when recording a video is too obvious.
Lastly, the discrepancy in the shoulder-surfing resistance
between Colorwheels and the grid-based scheme in the two
studies might be due to the differences in the study setting
leading to a stronger attacker in the lab study.
Replicability. Using videos for the evaluation of the shoulder-
surfing resistance poses the challenge of selecting represen-
tative videos. Thus, we used recordings of one single expert
user, but varied the speed and interaction between the videos.
The participants saw the videos in a randomized order to
mitigate ordering bias. To increase the replicability of our
results, the videos are available as supplemental material. An-
other aspect potentially impacting replicability is the choice
of the password used in the shoulder-surfing studies. As we
outlined in section 5 the password was chosen as to not favor
any scheme over the others. However, users seldom choose
random passwords for their accounts. Thus, the shoulder-
surfing results might differ, when another password is used.
In particular, dictionary words might impair the resistance
of the grid-based scheme.
Reliability. Our implementations recorded the effective-
ness and efficiency metrics automatically and therefore re-
liably without errors. The satisfaction was measured using
the standardized SUS. With respect to the recording of the
shoulder-surfing metric, i.e. the password guesses, the on-
line study recorded the password entry in a text field not
obfuscating the input (i.e. not hiding the password behind
symbols such as “*”) and in the lab study the experimenter
always clarified any legibility issues. Thus, we argue that
the results of our studies are as reliable as possible. How-
ever, contrary to our expectations, participants asked to be
allowed to stop the shoulder-surfing task prematurely, if they
believed it to be futile. We let those participants stop out of
ethical considerations and since we believe that this might
reflect the sentiment of an opportunistic observer in the real
world. This introduced the subjective perception of success
probability into our shoulder-surfing metric for the lab study.
Thus, a direct comparison of the two studies is not possible.
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